In early 2007, Prime Minister Abe proposed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quadrilateral Initiative,” under which India would join a formal multilateral dialogue with Japan, the United States and Australia. [25] China sent diplomatic protests to the four members of the quadrilateral before an official convention of its members. [26] Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, who succeeded Abe, downplayed China`s importance in the Japan-India pact signed after the creation of the quadrilateral, stating, “China has been mentioned – and we have no acceptance of a third country as a target like China.” Indian Foreign Minister Shiv Shankar Menon also argued that the defense deal was long overdue due to India`s cargo trade with Japan and was not specifically aimed at China. [27] Although relations with Taiwan have not been formally addressed by the quad-commencing countries, they have strengthened diplomacy with the island nation. Effective March 16, 2018, the United States signed the Taiwan Travel Act, which “allows for high-level diplomatic engagement between Taiwanese and U.S. officials and encourages visits between U.S. and Taiwanese government officials at all levels.” The United States has also been selling high-tech weapons to defend the island since 2018. On March 26, 2020, the United States signed the TAIPEI Act to “expand the scope of U.S. relations with Taiwan and encourage other nations and international organizations to strengthen their official and unofficial relations with the island nation.” As recently as April 2020, Health Minister Alex Azer became the first high-ranking politician to visit and discuss diplomacy since the 20th century. [47] This increased tensions between the CCP and the Republic of China (Republic of China), which led to a series of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to protect the nation from attacks by the People`s Liberation Army. In November 2020, the United States and Taiwan signed a 5-year agreement on economic development, health, and technology and safety cooperation. The U.S.
has also sent a U.S. Navy Admeral, paid more attention to its embassy in Taipei, and hopes the U.S. EPA will visit Taiwan in December 2020. A report released by the U.S. think tank Center for a New American Security, CNAS, called for greater U.S. involvement in Asia, saying that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, “America`s strategic concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan are undermining its ability to adapt to major power changes in the Asia-Pacific region, that actively challenge America`s traditional role in the balance of power in the region.” [15] Prominent U.S. politicians from both the Democratic and Republican parties have spoken out in favor of more aggressive diplomacy in Asia. India`s massive pandemic crisis, especially at the height of the second wave in April and May 2021, has led many to question whether the Quad could meet its ambitious vaccine production targets.
Similarly, with regard to climate action, observers questioned whether the cluster could complement the existing multilateral framework to address perhaps humanity`s greatest challenge in contemporary history. In the field of technology, members are divided by disagreements over data localization. The Biden administration`s withdrawal from Afghanistan, which could fuel the rise of terrorist networks in that troubled country, could undermine the Quad`s shared commitment to fighting terrorism while raising questions about America`s willingness to redeploy resources for the dark task of dismantling terrorist networks it already believed defeated. In the absence of a coherent economic strategy to build coherent and secure supply chains, the quad risks standing only on one leg in a region that cares deeply about economic integration and state spirit. Most importantly, the Quad must convince deeply ambivalent nations, especially in Southeast Asia, that it offers its partners more than military power and security. As the leaders of the four countries travel to Washington at the end of September, these concerns undoubtedly play into the minds of both sides. To achieve its goals, the Quad has stepped up its military activities in recent years – and this has not escaped global attention. On the one hand, the navies of the four countries are participating in the high-profile Malabar exercises. At the same time, bilateral military relations in the form of exercises and defense agreements have also tightened. Equally important, high-level 2+2 dialogues between Member States have become a regular part of the diplomatic calendar. Other outcomes could include a possible agreement to build secure supply chains for semiconductor chips and new promises to reduce carbon emissions and promote clean energy. For India, however, the new defense deal is inextricably linked to its own participation and strategic calculations in relation to the Quad.
In particular, AUKUS highlights some of the dilemmas India faces regarding the Quad: sharing or shifting the burden of containing China in the Indo-Pacific, and pledging to be even more dependent on the US as a defense partner. .
